

Remuneration Policy and Report

2025



Remuneration Policy and Report 2025

in accordance with Article 123-ter of the CFA and 84-quater
of the Consob Issuers' Regulation

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Approved by the Board of Directors on March 12, 2026

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Letter of the Chairperson of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee

Dear shareholders,

as Chairperson of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and together with my colleagues Patrizia Riva and Ilaria Maria Dalla Riva, I am pleased to submit for your attention Aquafil's Remuneration Policy and Report.

2025 saw Aquafil continue on the path of continuous improvement that it began in FY 2022 with respect to the Group's Remuneration Policy.

Our objective is to unceasingly enhance the management practices designed to attract, motivate and retain the human capital that is essential in guaranteeing the Group's sustainable success.

As such, the short- and long-term ESG-based incentive systems were maintained once again in the Remuneration Policy proposed for 2026.

As in the past, the current Policy for 2026 - set out in Section I of this Report - aligns perfectly with market best practices. It also respects the Chairperson of the Corporate Governance Committee's recommendations on remuneration.

Information on remuneration paid in FY 2025 - set out in Section II of the Report - comprises all the relevant details and figures.

The Remuneration Policy and Report 2025 was approved by the Board of Directors on March 12, 2026 and is submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting in accordance with Article 123-ter of the CFA.

Together with my colleagues - to whom I express my heartfelt thanks for providing their expertise and professionalism to the Committee - I hope that the continued improvement in the content of our Policy and the quality of the disclosure in the Report will bear witness to the Committee's commitment, and hope, too, that it will meet with the broadest support at the Shareholders' Meeting.



Roberto Siagri, Presidente del Comitato per le Nomine e le Remunerazioni di Aquafil



Roberto Siagri
*Chairperson of the Appointments
and Remuneration Committee*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Remuneration component	Purpose	Award conditions	Amounts / Values %
Fixed remuneration	Takes account of the extent and strategic importance of the role, its distinctive characteristics and the strategic skills held	Salary level based on positioning in relation to market benchmark analysis	The fixed remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is Euro 1,250,000
Short-Term Variable Compensation (STI)	Designed to encourage management to work towards the achievement of annual targets that maximise the Aquafil Group's value, in line with shareholders' interests	<p>KPI:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EBITDA (weighting 50%) NFP/EBITDA (weighting 25%) ESG (weighting 25%) <p>Threshold: compliance with financial covenants</p> <p>Cap: there is a cap on the payout equal to 125% of the target incentive</p> <p>Clawback clause</p>	<p>CEO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target: 22% of Fixed Remuneration <p>Executive Directors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target: 50% of Fixed Remuneration <p>SEs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target: ranging between 40% and 50% of Fixed Remuneration
Long-Term Variable Compensation - 2026-2028 LTI Plan	Encourages alignment between shareholder interests and sustainability of value creation in the medium to long term	<p>Instrument: monetary</p> <p>Frequency of allocation: annual (rolling plan)</p> <p>Performance period: three years</p> <p>KPI:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TSR (weighting 30%) ESG (weighting 25%) EBITDA (weighting 25%) NFP/EBITDA (weighting 20%) <p>Deferment: 50% of the bonus for a period of one year</p> <p>Cap: there is a cap on the payout equal to 125% of the target incentive</p> <p>Clawback clause</p>	<p>CEO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target: 22% of Fixed Remuneration <p>Executive Directors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target: 50% of Fixed Remuneration <p>SEs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target: ranging between 40% and 50% of Fixed Remuneration
Benefit	Combines compensation packages for improved alignment with market standards	Provision of goods and/or services in line with market practice and applicable regulations	Company car- insurance policies at least equal to those guaranteed to Company executives by the National Collective Bargaining Agreements for Industrial Executives



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 REGULATORY REFERENCES

This Report was prepared by Aquafil in accordance with Article 123-ter of the CFA, Article 84-quater of the Issuers' Regulation, in addition to, on the basis of self-regulation, the Corporate Governance Code, which Aquafil complies with.

Furthermore, Legislative Decree No. 49 of 2019 introduced and implemented into Italian law the principles and provisions included in the Shareholder Rights Directive II, approved in 2017. Certain amendments were introduced to Article 123-ter of the CFA through this decree, among which, the binding vote of the Shareholders' Meeting on the first section of the report relating to the remuneration policy, and the non-binding vote on the second section of the report concerning compensation paid.

In preparing this report, account was taken of the indications expressed on the subject of remuneration policy by Consob, most recently with Resolution No. 21623 of December 10, 2020, which amended the Issuers' Regulation in implementation of the CFA. In addition, the principles expressed in Article 5 of the Corporate Governance Code for Listed Companies 2020 edition ("**2020 Code**") (with the specifications indicated below), in addition to the recommendations suggested by the Corporate Governance Committee, were adopted as general reference guidelines on remuneration policies.

1.2 PURPOSE AND CONTENT

The annual remuneration report provides information aimed at increasing the knowledge and awareness of shareholders, investors and the market in general, as well as Consob, on the remuneration policies adopted by the Company, and on the amounts and composition of the remuneration paid to the beneficiaries.

Pursuant to Article 123-ter of the CFA, the Report comprises two sections.

Section I describes:

- A. the Remuneration Policy adopted by the Company in 2026 for (i) Members of the Company's Board of Directors, distinguishing between Executive and Non-Executive Directors; (ii) Members of the Board of Statutory Auditors; and (iii) Senior Executives of the Group;
- B. the procedures utilised for the preparation and adoption of the Remuneration Policy, in addition to the boards and parties responsible for the Policy's correct implementation.

Section II of the Report provides, with reference to FY 2025:

- i. adequate and detailed information on the remuneration of Directors, with reference to fixed and variable monetary items, in addition to any other forms of remuneration, non-monetary benefits, and any other indemnity or form of compensation agreed in relation to early termination or natural termination without renewal of the office held;
- ii. detailed information on the remuneration of Statutory Auditors;
- iii. aggregate information on the remuneration of Senior Executives, with reference to fixed and variable monetary items, in addition to any other forms of remuneration, non-monetary benefits, and any other indemnity or form of compensation agreed in relation to early termination or natural termination without renewal of the office held.

1.3 PREPARATION AND STRUCTURE

The Remuneration Policy was prepared by the Company and approved by the Board of Directors on March 12, 2026, upon the recommendation of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and after consultation with the Board of Statutory Auditors.

This Report is sent to Borsa Italiana and is made available to the public at Aquafil's registered office (Via Linfano 9, Arco) and on the Company's website www.aquafil.com, in the Corporate Governance section, at least twenty-one days before the Shareholders' Meeting called to approve the annual financial statements at December 31, 2025.

This Report is structured according to the guidelines set out in Article 84-quater of the Issuers' Regulation and in compliance with Annex 3, Schedule 7-bis and Schedule 7-ter referred to therein.

A relative table, as per Article 84-quater, paragraph 4 of the Issuers' Regulation, presents holdings in the Company or its subsidiaries by these parties (and by parties related to them).

Section I

1. GOVERNANCE – COMPLIANCE – MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

The principal parties and bodies involved in the preparation and approval of the Remuneration Policy are the Shareholders' Meeting, the Board of Directors, the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and the Board of Statutory Auditors.

The Board of Directors and the Appointments and Remuneration Committee are also responsible for the correct implementation of the Remuneration Policy and oversee its correct implementation.

A brief description of the duties, which in accordance with the applicable regulation and the By-Laws are required of these Boards with regards to the remuneration of the Directors, is provided below.

Shareholders' Meetings

The Shareholders' Meeting:

- establishes the total remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors in accordance with Article 2364, paragraph 1, No. 3) of the Civil Code, also in accordance with Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code and Article 15 of the By-Laws;
- resolves, with a binding vote, as regards Section I of the Report, in accordance with Article 123-ter, paragraph 3-ter of the CFA;
- resolves, with a non-binding vote, as regards Section II of the Report, in accordance with Article 123-ter, paragraph 6 of the CFA;
- establishes any share-based remuneration plans or other financial instruments for Directors, employees or collaborators, including Senior Executives, where existing, in accordance with Article 114-bis of the CFA.

Board of Directors

The Board of Directors:

- establishes internally an Appointments and Remuneration Committee;
- establishes the remuneration of the Executive Directors on the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, with prior opinion from the Board of Statutory Auditors, in accordance with Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code and breaks down the fixed annual remuneration for execution of office, established in totality by the Shareholders' Meeting;
- defines and reviews, on the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, the Remuneration Policy;
- approves the Report in accordance with Articles 123-ter of the CFA and 84-quater of the Issuers' Regulation;
- prepares any remuneration plans based on shares or other financial instruments for Directors, employees and collaborators, including Senior Executives, where existing, submitting such for the approval of the Shareholders' Meeting in accordance with Article 114-bis of the CFA and oversees their implementation.

Appointments and Remuneration Committee

The Appointments and Remuneration Committee is an advisory and proposing body that - in its capacity as remuneration committee - has the task of assisting the Board of Directors through investigative functions in the assessments and decisions concerning the remuneration policy of Directors and Senior Executives. Specifically:

- periodically assesses the suitability, overall consistency and real application of the remuneration policy for Directors and Senior Executives. In the latter regard, it makes use of information provided by the Chief Executive Officers; formulates proposals to the Board of Directors on this matter, also with reference to the Board of Directors of the subsidiaries; and
- presents proposals or expresses opinions to the Board of Directors on the remuneration of Executive Direc-

tors and other Senior Directors, as well as establishing the performance targets related to the variable component of this remuneration; assesses the possibility of establishing long-term incentive plans for Executive Directors and Senior Executives; monitors the application of the decisions adopted by the Board verifying, in particular, the achievement of the performance targets.

The Appointments and Remuneration Committee is composed of three Non-Executive, Independent Directors. Directors Patrizia Riva and Ilaria Maria Dalla Riva were appointed by Board of Directors resolution on April 27, 2023. In FY 2024, following the resignation of the Director Mr. Francesco Profumo, Mr. Roberto Siagri was co-opted to the Board of Directors (for further information, refer to the Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure Report 2024, approved on March 18, 2025). Following his co-option, Mr. Siagri was also appointed, for the purposes relevant herein, Chairperson of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee.

This committee currently comprises:

- Roberto Siagri (Chairperson);
- Patrizia Riva;
- Ilaria Maria Dalla Riva.

Upon appointment and, most recently, on March 12, 2026, the Board of Directors positively assessed that all members of the Committee met the requirements of adequate knowledge and expertise in financial matters and, in particular, that the Chairperson met the requirement of experience in remuneration policies.


The composition, duties and operating procedures of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee are governed by the Corporate Governance Code and specific regulations, approved by the Board of Directors and most recently updated on February 15, 2024.

Meetings of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee are attended by the Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors and/or the Statutory Auditors and, on invitation, by representatives of company departments and independent experts and/or other parties, whose participation is considered beneficial for the discussion of the matters at issue.

Where considered necessary or beneficial for the execution of its duties, the Appointments and Remuneration Committee may utilise external remuneration policy consultants. In 2025, the Appointments and Remuneration Committee met seven times, in addition to four meetings in the first quarter of 2026. The attendance of Committee members is reported in the Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure Report, available on the company website www.aquafil.com.

Appointments and Remuneration Committee meetings were always attended by the Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors and all Statutory Auditors (with the exception of one Committee meeting, when one Statutory Auditor was absent with justification). Executive Directors and/or Senior Executives did not participate in Committee discussions that concerned decisions relating to their compensation or that placed them in situations of conflict of interest.

APPOINTMENTS AND REMUNERATION COMMITTEE BUSINESS CYCLE 2024



The Board of Statutory Auditors expresses an opinion upon the remuneration proposals of the Executive Directors, in accordance with Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, verifying the consistency of such with the Remuneration Policy adopted by the Company.

Independent Audit Firm

The independent audit firm of Aquafil verifies that the Directors have prepared the second section of the Report, as required by Article 123-ter, paragraph 8-bis of the CFA.

2. REMUNERATION POLICY

2.1 PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY

Aquafil's Remuneration Policy is based on the following key principles and is defined according to the following criteria:

- this policy seeks to attract, retain and motivate individuals of high professional standing, with particular regard to key positions for the development and management of the business, through a remuneration structure which recognises the value of the individual and their contribution to company growth. In determining the Company's Remuneration Policy, the working conditions of its employees were considered;
- the contribution to the Company's strategy and sustainability: remuneration recognizes the achievement of performance targets, mainly in terms of economic-financial indicators and set and measurable targets. To reinforce the progress towards generating shared value, the Group has aligned its Remuneration Policy with its sustainability strategy, including the main objectives of the Sustainability Plan within the short-term (STI) and long-term (LTI) variable incentive system;
- the alignment of the interests of company and Group management with the pursuit of the objective to create value for Aquafil shareholders over the medium/long-term. In this regard, a long-term incentive system linked in part to Total Shareholder Return performance over a three-year time period was introduced. Alignment with shareholder interests is further strengthened by an appropriate balance between the fixed and variable components.

In line with the above principles, the Company shall present this document for the approval of the Shareholders' Meeting of April 28, 2026.

2.2 CHANGES TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY

As compared to the Remuneration Policy approved for FY 2025 by the Shareholders' Meeting on April 28, 2025, this Remuneration Policy remains substantially in line with the previous Policy.

The 2026 STI Plan calls for the overall weighting of ESG targets to remain at 25%, eliminating the parameter of post-consumer waste collection to create new recycled materials, and maintaining only the parameter of ECONYL®-branded product revenues as a proportion of fibre revenues.

The 2026-2030 LTI Plan retains the same performance parameters set out in the 2023-2025 LTI Plan.

2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY

The Remuneration Policy provides that the fixed and variable components are established on the basis of principles and processes according to the beneficiary category.

In this regard, on March 12, 2026, the Board of Directors of the Company, on the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, identified - in light of the positions and respective roles held within the Group - the Senior Executives for the purposes of the remuneration policy.

The Company in any case considered it appropriate to create a remuneration system based on the Executive/managerial responsibilities of the parties concerned and therefore independently set the criteria for determining the remuneration of: Directors, Executive Directors, Board of Statutory Auditors, and Senior Executives.

Directors

All Directors receive a fixed remuneration which appropriately compensates the work and commitment they provide to the Company.

The Shareholders' Meeting held on April 27, 2023, with regard to the definition of the remuneration due to the Directors, resolved to set the Board of Directors' remuneration at a total of Euro 440,000 per year, to be distributed among its members in compliance with the resolutions to be taken by the Board of Directors, subject to any further remuneration due to the Directors holding specific offices to be established by the Board of Directors pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3, of the Civil Code.

In fulfilment of the foregoing and as a breakdown of the total remuneration awarded by the Shareholders' Meeting, the Board of Directors meeting held on April 27, 2023 for the mandate 2023-2025, determined the following remuneration:

REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS - 2023-2025 MANDATE			
Member of the B.o.D.	€ 40.000	Appointments and Remuneration Committee:	
		Chairperson	€ 15.000
		Member	€ 10.000
		Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee:	
		Chairperson	€ 15.000
		Member	€ 10.000

For details regarding compensation paid please see Table 1.

Non-Executive Directors (whether or not Independent Directors) are paid a fixed annual fee for the office outlined above, which is determined on an individual basis by the Board of Directors in view of the total amount determined by the Shareholders' Meeting, pursuant to Article 2389 of the Civil Code.

On May 11, 2023, after consultation with the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and with the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Board of Directors resolved to award the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, Ms. Chiara Mio the sum of Euro 100,000 (one hundred thousand) per fiscal year, in consideration of this particular office pursuant to Article 2389, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.

The remuneration of these Directors is not based on any financial results or specific objectives of the Company and is commensurate with the commitment required, also in relation to participation on internal Board committees, for which specific remuneration is allocated.


In continuity with that Remuneration Policy, on March 12, 2026, the Aquafil Board of Directors called the Shareholders' Meeting for April 28, 2026, for the purpose of appointing the new Board, proposing, among other matters, that an annual compensation of Euro 440,000 (per calendar year, and therefore with application of the pro-rata amount for fractions of a year) be recognised for the entire Board. This will be divided among its members in accordance with the resolutions to be taken by the Board of Directors, without prejudice to any additional remuneration due to Directors holding special offices to be established by the Board of Directors.

Executive Directors - Chief Executive Officer and other Executive Directors

The remuneration of Executive Directors is adequately balanced in order to ensure consistency between short-term development objectives, while taking into account the values of sustainability that drive operations, aimed at creating value for shareholders in the long term.

CEO TARGET REMUNERATION PACKAGE

FIXED REMUNERATION		VARIABLE REMUNERATION		FRINGE BENEFITS
Fixed compensation	€ 1,250,000	STI (target bonus)	€ 275,000	Company car and insurance policy for medical expenses, death, permanent disability and injury at least equal to the policies guaranteed by National Collective Bargaining Agreements for company directors.
		LTI (target bonus)	€ 275,000	
		Totale variabile (target)	€ 550.000 Totale	
			€ 1,800,000	



Specifically, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)'s remuneration structure is made up of:

- **a fixed component:** this component takes account of the extent and strategic importance of the role, its subjective distinctive characteristics and the strategic skills assigned to the role. Considering the benchmark analyses and the prior opinion of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, along with that of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the CEO's total fixed remuneration, including the fixed compensation received from the subsidiary company Tessilquattro S.p.A., was approved by the Board of Directors on May 11, 2023, at Euro 1,250,000 (one million two hundred and fifty thousand) per fiscal year.
- **a short-term variable component:** the purpose of this component is to encourage management to work towards the achievement of annual targets that maximise the Aquafil Group's value, in line with shareholders' interests. The target bonus is determined as a percentage of fixed remuneration and is set at 22%. The maximum bonus is 125% of the target bonus. The entry threshold includes compliance with financial covenants. For the description of the short-term variable component reference should be made to Paragraph 2.4.
- **a long-term variable component:** The Chief Executive Officer was included among the beneficiaries of the Company's long-term monetary incentive plans (2023-2025 LTI Plan - 2026-2028 LTI Plan). This component is designed to incentivise management to work toward achieving medium- to long-term goals. The target bonus is determined as a percentage of fixed remuneration and is set at 22%. The maximum bonus is 125% of the target bonus.
For the description of the long-term variable component and of the changes made, reference should be made to Paragraph 2.5.
- **fringe benefits:** fringe benefits concern the supply of goods and/or services assigned in accordance with market practice and as per applicable legislation. In particular, Aquafil's Chief Executive Officer is the beneficiary of a company car and of insurance policies for the reimbursement of medical expenses, death, permanent disability and accident at least of the same level as those guaranteed to the Company's Executives under the National Collective Bargaining Agreements for Industrial Executives policy.

The remuneration of the other Executive Directors comprises:

- **a fixed component:** this component takes account of the extent and strategic importance of the role, its subjective distinctive characteristics and the strategic skills assigned to the role. The amount is sufficient to remunerate the service also in the case of the partial reaching of the performance targets upon which the variable remuneration component is based. More specifically, the fixed component is calculated according to

the size of the business managed, the various areas of responsibility covered, Aquafil Group's complex corporate structure, including internationally, also taking account of market practice for similar positions at industrial sector companies.

- **a short-term variable component:** encourages management to work towards the achievement of annual targets that maximise the Aquafil Group's value, in line with shareholders' interests. The target bonus is determined as a percentage of fixed remuneration and is set at 50%. The maximum bonus is 125% of the target bonus. The entry threshold includes compliance with financial covenants.
For the description of the short-term variable component reference should be made to Paragraph 2.4.
- **a long-term variable component:** the other Executive Directors were included among the beneficiaries of the Company's long-term monetary incentive plans (2023-2025 LTI Plan - 2026-2028 LTI Plan). This component is designed to incentivise management to work toward achieving medium- to long-term goals. The target bonus is determined as a percentage of fixed remuneration and is set at 50%. The maximum bonus is 125% of the target bonus.
For the description of the long-term variable component and of the changes made, reference should be made to Paragraph 2.5.
- **fringe benefits:** fringe benefits concern the supply of goods and/or services assigned in accordance with market practice and as per applicable legislation. In particular, Executive Directors do not benefit from fringe benefits for that role, but rather as Senior Executives of the Company, with the provision of a company car and insurance policies for the reimbursement of medical expenses, death, permanent invalidity and accident at least of the same level as those guaranteed to the Company's Executives under the National Collective Bargaining Agreements for Industrial Executives policy.

Board of Statutory Auditors

All the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors receive a fixed fee which appropriately compensates the work and commitment provided by the Statutory Auditors to the Company, and commensurate with the commitment required, the importance of the role covered as well as the size and sector of the Company.

As regards the definition of the remuneration due to the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Shareholders' Meeting of April 23, 2024, resolved to grant the Board - which will remain in office until the approval of the Annual Accounts for the year ending December 31, 2026 - a total remuneration of Euro 140,000.00 (one hundred and forty thousand), of which Euro 60,000.00 (sixty thousand) for the Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors and Euro 40,000.00 (forty thousand) for each of the two Statutory Auditors.

Senior Executives

The remuneration of Senior Executives is structured so as to focus management on company results and the creation of value.

The remuneration of Senior Executives is composed of:

- **a fixed component:** this component takes into account the breadth and strategic relevance of the role played and the distinctive subjective characteristics and strategic skills of the beneficiary, in addition to market practice for comparable positions. The amount is sufficient to remunerate the service also in the case of the non-reaching of the performance targets upon which the variable remuneration component is based;
- **a short-term variable component:** encourages management to work towards the achievement of annual targets that maximise the Aquafil Group's value, in line with shareholders' interests. The weighting of the short-term variable component ranges between 40% and 50% of fixed remuneration, depending on the strategic importance of the role. The maximum bonus is 125% of the target bonus. The entry threshold includes

compliance with financial covenants. For the description of the short-term variable component reference should be made to Paragraph 2.4.

- **a long-term variable component:** for details regarding the 2023-2025 LTI Plan and the 2026-2028 LTI Plan, please see paragraph 2.5. For participants, the target award is determined as a percentage value of fixed remuneration and can range between 40% and 50%, depending on the strategic importance of the role. The maximum bonus is 125% of the target bonus. For the description of the long-term variable component and of the changes made, reference should be made to Paragraph 2.5.
- **fringe benefits:** fringe benefits concern the supply of goods and/or services assigned in accordance with market practice and as per applicable legislation.

2.4 SHORT-TERM VARIABLE COMPONENT

The purpose of the short-term variable component is to encourage management to work towards the achievement of annual targets that maximise the Aquafil Group's value, in line with shareholders' interests.

Beneficiaries

The Board of Directors has identified as beneficiaries of the short-term variable component the Chief Executive Officer, the other Executive Directors, the Senior Executives and other figures with strategic importance for the Group.

Calculation method

The system provides for the assignment of performance targets that are structured as a percentage of the target incentive amount assigned:


Targets	Weighting
EBITDA	50%
NFP/EBITDA	25%
ESG targets	25%
Total	100%

The "ESG targets" parameter refers to Econyl®-branded product revenues as a proportion of fibre revenues. This parameter, which is the same for all beneficiaries of the STI system, ensures a direct link between the short-term incentive system and the Company's sustainability strategy.

For EBITDA and ESG targets, a minimum, target and maximum achievement level are defined:

- Below the minimum level, the portion of the bonus linked to the relevant parameters does not accrue;
- At the minimum level, 55% of the bonus related to EBITDA and 50% of the premium related to ESG goals accrues;
- At the target level, 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum or higher level, 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism;
- The entry threshold includes compliance with financial covenants.

The STI incentive strategy for the EBITDA performance target is set out below:



For the ratio of NFP to EBITDA, the threshold level is the same as the target level. For this parameter, Aquafil does not consider it permissible to reward a result below the targets set out in the Budget:

- Below the 100% target level, the portion of the bonus linked to the relevant parameter does not accrue;
- At the target level (100%), 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum level (110%) or higher, 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism;
- The entry threshold includes compliance with financial covenants.

The bonus will be paid in full following approval of the consolidated financial statements for the year to which the short-term variable component relates.

Maximum amount of the Individual Component

The short-term variable component may never exceed a cap equal to 125% of the target bonus.

Other provisions

The annual incentive plan includes a clawback clause which permits the recovery in the 5 years subsequent to issue of amounts issued on the basis of manifestly erroneous or false data. There are also mechanisms in place to deal with good/bad leavers.


2.5 LONG-TERM VARIABLE COMPONENT

2.5.1 The 2023-2025 LTI Plan

Considering the prior opinion of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and that of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Board of Directors has approved the introduction of a long-term incentive system (2023-2025 LTI Plan).

In terms of targets, Aquafil's 2023-2025 LTI Plan seeks to create maximum alignment between the interests of the beneficiaries and the pursuit of the overriding objective of sustainable value creation for shareholders in the medium/long term.

The 2023-2025 LTI Plan is a rolling monetary plan based around three cycles, each lasting three years (first cycle 2023-2025, second cycle 2024-2026, third cycle 2025-2027). For beneficiaries, after the three-year vesting there is an additional one-year deferral period relating to 50% of the accrued bonus.



Beneficiaries

The Board of Directors has identified as beneficiaries of the long-term variable component (2023-2025 LTI Plan) the Chief Executive Officer, the other Executive Directors, and other figures with strategic importance for the Group.

Calculation method

The system provides for the assignment of performance targets that are structured as a percentage of the target incentive amount assigned:

Targets	Weighting
Absolute TSR	30%
ESG Risk Rating	25%
Cumulative 3-Year EBITDA	25%
NFP/EBITDA	20%
Total	100%

As regards the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) parameter, the bonus accrues on the basis of the performance of Aquafil's TSR at the end of the vesting period relative to a predefined scale of values between minimum, target, and maximum:

- Below the minimum level, the portion of the bonus linked to the TSR does not accrue;
- At the minimum level, 50% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the target level, 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum or higher level, 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism.

The ESG Sustainability Risk Rating target initially contained in the LTI Plan referred to Aquafil's ranking on the risk rating scale in the ESG arena according to Sustainalytics. The target considers the degree of improvement achieved in the rating.


Since, as of FY 2025, it will no longer be possible to obtain a rating through Sustainalytics, in this Report the performance target has been changed from the 2025 Remuneration Policy for the 2023-2025, 2024-2026, and 2025-2027 cycles, replacing it with the ESG Rating assessment provided by Ecovadis.

The bonus will accrue on the basis of the performance of Aquafil's ESG Risk Rating as expressed by Ecovadis at the

end of the vesting period, relative to a predefined scale of values between minimum, target, and maximum:

- Below the minimum level, the portion of the bonus linked to the ESG Risk Rating does not accrue;
- At the minimum level, 50% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the target level, 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum or higher level, 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism.

The LTI incentive strategy for the cumulative three-year EBITDA performance target is set out below:



For the target NFP to EBITDA ratio, as in the short-term system, the incentive strategy provides that the threshold level should be equal to the target level, as it does not consider it permissible to reward a result below the targets defined under the three-year plan:

- Below the 100% target level, the portion of the bonus linked to the parameter does not accrue;
- At the target level (100%), 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum level or higher (110%), 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism.

Maximum amount of the Individual Component

The long-term variable component may never exceed a cap equal to 125% of the target bonus.

Other provisions

The long-term incentive plan includes a clawback clause which permits, for five years following the issue of the bonus, the recovery of amounts issued on the basis of manifestly erroneous or false data. This clause applies to bonuses paid to Executive Directors and Senior Executives included in the cycles of the incentive system beginning with bonuses earned during 2023. There are also mechanisms in place to deal with good/bad leavers.

2.5.2 THE 2026-2028 LTI PLAN

In view of the expiration of the 2023-2025 LTI Plan, and considering the prior opinion of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and that of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Board of Directors resolve, on March 12, 2026, to introduce a long-term incentive system (2026-2028 LTI Plan) to be submitted to the Shareholders' Meeting to be held on April 28, 2026. As outlined above, this Plan follows the parameters set forth in the 2023-2025 LTI Plan.

In terms of targets, Aquafil's 2026-2028 LTI Plan retains the objective of creating maximum alignment between the interests of the beneficiaries and the pursuit of the overriding objective of sustainable value creation for shareholders in the medium/long term.

The 2026-2028 LTI Plan provides only one three-year cycle. For beneficiaries, after the three-year vesting there is an additional one-year deferral period relating to 50% of the accrued bonus.



Beneficiaries

The Board of Directors has identified as beneficiaries of the 2026-2028 LTI Plan long-term variable component the Chief Executive Officer, the other Executive Directors, and other figures with strategic importance for the Group.

Calculation method

The system provides for the assignment of performance targets that are structured as a percentage of the target incentive amount assigned:

Targets	Weighting
Absolute TSR	30%
ESG Risk Rating	25%
Cumulative 3-Year EBITDA	25%
NFP/EBITDA	20%
Total	100%

As regards the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) parameter, the 2026-2028 LTI bonus accrues on the basis of the performance of Aquafil's TSR at the end of the vesting period relative to a predefined scale of values between minimum, target, and maximum:

- Below the minimum level, the portion of the bonus linked to the TSR does not accrue;
- At the minimum level, 50% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the target level, 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum or higher level, 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism.


The ESG Sustainability Risk Rating target contained in the 2026-2028 LTI Plan refers to Aquafil's ranking on the risk rating scale in the ESG arena according to EcoVadis.

The bonus will accrue on the basis of the performance of Aquafil's ESG Risk Rating as expressed by Ecovadis at the

end of the vesting period, relative to a predefined scale of values between minimum, target, and maximum:

- Below the minimum level, the portion of the bonus linked to the ESG Risk Rating does not accrue;
- At the minimum level, 50% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the target level, 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum or higher level, 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism.

The 2026-2028 LTI incentive strategy for the cumulative three-year EBITDA performance target is set out below:



For the target NFP to EBITDA ratio, as in the short-term system, the 2026-2028 LTI incentive strategy provides that the threshold level should be equal to the target level, as it does not consider it permissible to reward a result below the targets defined under the three-year plan:

- Below the 100% target level, the portion of the bonus linked to the parameter does not accrue;
- At the target level (100%), 100% of the relative bonus accrues;
- At the maximum level or higher (110%), 125% of the relative bonus accrues;
- Intermediate levels use a linear interpolation mechanism.

Maximum amount of the Individual Component

The long-term variable component may never exceed a cap equal to 125% of the target bonus.

Other provisions

The long-term incentive plan includes a clawback clause which permits, for five years following the issue of the bonus, the recovery of amounts issued on the basis of manifestly erroneous or false data. This clause applies to bonuses paid to Executive Directors and Senior Executives included in the cycles of the incentive system. There are also mechanisms in place to deal with good/bad leavers.

2.6 POLICY RELATING TO TREATMENTS ESTABLISHED IN THE EVENT OF TERMINATION OF OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT

The Company has not adopted a policy relating to treatments established in the event of termination of office or employment.

2.7 INDICATION OF ANY OTHER COMPANIES' REMUNERATION POLICIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN USED AS BENCHMARKS, AND CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF SUCH COMPANIES

Except as indicated in the reference to market practices on remuneration policy, this Remuneration Policy has not been defined using the remuneration policies of specific companies as a benchmark.

2.8 WAIVER PROCEDURE

As provided for in Article 123-ter, paragraph 3-bis of the CFA, and Article 84-quater of the Issuers' Regulation, in exceptional cases, the Board of Directors may deem it necessary to temporarily waive elements of this Policy in order to pursue long-term interests, to ensure the sustainability of the company as a whole, or to ensure its ability to stay in the market. These exceptional circumstances refer to certain situations that can be traced back to the following: attraction and retention of strategic figures and recognition for individual or collective results that are particularly significant and positive for the Company.

In the event that the prerequisites are met, the temporary waiver of the 2026 Policy must be approved by the Board of Directors, upon the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, having consulted the Board of Statutory Auditors, in compliance with current laws and regulations.

The elements that the Company may decide to waive under the above exceptional and temporary circumstances relate to the variable components of remuneration.

Section II

PART 1

1. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2025 REMUNERATION POLICY

The remuneration policy that the Company implemented in 2025 for Directors and Senior Executives in particular was consistent and in accordance with the 2025 Remuneration Policy approved by the Board of Directors on March 18, 2025 and in relation to which the Shareholders' Meeting held on April 28, 2025 passed a favourable resolution (with votes in favour totalling 97.870% of the voting rights at the Shareholders' Meeting).

In implementing the Remuneration Policy 2025, the Appointments and Remuneration Committee took into account the vote and opinions expressed by shareholders at the Shareholders' Meeting on April 28, 2025 on Section II of the Remuneration Policy and Report, which received favourable votes representing 99.602% of the voting rights present at the Shareholders' Meeting.

1.1 FIXED REMUNERATION

Table 1 provides details of remuneration paid in 2025 to individuals who held the positions of members of the governing and supervisory bodies and Senior Executives as a whole.

1.2 SHORT-TERM VARIABLE COMPONENT

In relation to the STI 2025 bonus, on March 12, 2026, upon the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and having consulted with the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Board of Directors verified the achievement of the EBITDA-related performance parameter and the ESG parameter related to ECONYL®-branded product revenues as a proportion of fibre revenues, which correspond to 40% vesting of the gross target value of the short-term incentive system.

The disbursement of the 2025 STI bonus has been changed slightly from the provisions of the Remuneration Policy approved in FY 2025, as further detailed in Paragraph 1.6 below.

1.3 LONG-TERM VARIABLE COMPONENT

In relation to the 2023-2025 LTI bonus, on March 12, 2026, upon the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and having consulted with the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Board of Directors ascertained the achievement of the performance parameter linked to the ESG EcoVadis Ranking, which corresponds to 31.3% (Cap) vesting of the gross value of the target of the short-term incentive system.

As regards the variable component, the methods of disbursement of the 2023-2025 LTI bonus are consistent with those described above. Please refer to Tables 1 and 3B below for more details.

1.4 INDEMNITY ON TERMINATION OF OFFICE/EMPLOYMENT AND NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS

At the date of this Report, there are no agreements in place between the Company and the members of the Board of Directors that provide for the payment of compensation in the event of termination of office.

1.5 APPLICATION OF EX POST CORRECTION MECHANISMS

During the year, there were no prerequisites for the application of ex post restitution mechanisms regarding the variable component (the clawback clause) under the 2025 incentive plan.

1.6 WAIVERS APPLIED TO THE REMUNERATION POLICY IN 2025

The 2025 Policy provided for Directors and the SEs included in the 2025 STI Plan was waived by a Board of Directors' resolution dated March 12, 2026, after consultation with the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and the Board of Statutory Auditors.

The 2025 Remuneration Policy included a change in the 2025 STI bonus that reduced the weighting of the EBITDA performance parameter from 55% to 50% and consequently increased the weighting of the NFP/EBITDA parameter from 20% to 25%.

Since the NFP/EBITDA KPI does not provide for a minimum payout threshold, reducing the minimum share linked to EBITDA from 27.5% to 25% would have resulted in a reduction in the overall minimum payout, as it was not possible to reallocate the differential to NFP/EBITDA.

In the document update process, the individual letters therefore continued to indicate the minimum EBITDA threshold of 27.5% of the total bonus, which is consistent with the previous configuration and the plan's overall balance.

Instead, the Remuneration Report describes the final parameter curve, which sees 50% of the KPI-related portion accrue when the minimum threshold is reached. The discrepancy therefore results from a failure to fully realign the final plan configuration with individual documentation. This discrepancy affected the 11 plan participants and led to a payout differential of approximately 2.5% of the total bonus, estimated to be around Euro 34 thousand total.

Considering the minor extent of the discrepancy and the fact that i) the wording of the individual letters represents the basis for economic communication to the beneficiaries; ii) the value indicated in the letters reflects the original overall logic of the plan and does not affect the economic balance of the plan; iii) the discrepancy is purely documentary in nature, on March 12, 2026, after consultation with the Appointments and Remuneration Committee and the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Board of Directors resolved to waive the 2025 Remuneration Policy consistent with the content of the individual letters.

Table comparing changes in the past four fiscal years between the annual change in total remuneration of Board and Board of Statutory Auditors members, company performance, and average gross annual employee remuneration.

The breakdown below gives information comparing the annual change, for the last four years: (i) in the Company's results, (ii) in the remuneration of each of the individuals for whom the information in this section of the Report is provided by name, and (iii) in the average remuneration of Aquafil's employees.

The calculation of remuneration considers fixed remuneration and the short-term variable component paid out for the year.

		2021 vs. 2022	2022 vs. 2023	2023 vs. 2024	2024 vs. 2025
Name	Office				
Giulio Bonazzi	Chief Executive Officer	14.8%	-35.1%	-2.5%	0.0%
Chiara Mio	Chairperson and Risk/Sus. Com. Member (Chairperson from 27.04.2023)		n.a.	41.9%	0.0%
Stefano Giovanni Loro	Executive Director	14.5%	-35.7%	0.0%	1.1%
Franco Rossi	Executive Director	18.9%	-37.1%	0.7%	16.3%
Roberto Siagri	Director and Chairperson App./Rem. Com. and Risk/ Sus. Com. Member from 01.06.2024			n.a.	71.4%
Ilaria Maria dalla Riva	Director and App./Rem. Com. Member	0.0%	-16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Patrizia Riva	Director and Chairperson App./Rem. Com. and App./Rem. Com. Member (member from 27.04.23)		n.a.	58.8%	0.0%
Silvana Bonazzi	Director	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Francesco Bonazzi	Director (from 27.04.2023)		n.a.	46.6%	0.0%
Stefano Poggi Longostrevi	Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bettina Solimando	Statutory Auditor	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Beatrice Bompieri	Statutory Auditor	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Average change in remuneration		-5.0%	-28.5%	3.6%	3.7%

PART 2

The table below reports:

- the detailed remuneration of Directors, Statutory Auditors and Senior Executives, including those who ceased to hold office during the year, accrued in 2025 for any reason and in any form with regard to the Company, its subsidiaries and associates as at December 31, 2025;
- amounts and fees which comprise the remuneration of the Statutory Auditors;
- amounts and fees comprising the remuneration of Senior Executives, with reference to fixed monetary items, in addition to any other forms of remuneration, non-monetary benefits, and any other indemnity or form of compensation agreed in relation to early termination or natural termination without renewal of the office held.

TABLE 1. REMUNERATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, GENERAL MANAGERS AND SENIOR EXECUTIVES

Name	Office	Period of office	Concl. of office	Fixed remuneration	Committee remuneration	Variable remuneration		Non-monetary benefits	Other remuneration	Total remuneration	Benefits on conclusions of office
						Bonuses and other incentives	Profit sharing				
Giulio Bonazzi	Chief Executive Officer	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€1,110,000 (1)		€266,385				€1,376,385	
				€143,000 (2)						€ 143,000	
Total				€1,253,000		€266,385				€1,519,385	
Chiara Mio	Chairperson of the Board of Directors	1.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€140,000 (3)	€10,000 (4)					€150,000	
Total				€140,000	€10,000					€150,000	
Franco Rossi	Executive Director	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (5)						€40,000	
				€405,365 (6)		€183,491		€10,418		€599,274	
Total				€445,365		€183,491		€10,418		€639,274	
Roberto Siagri	Director Chairperson, Appointments and Remuneration Committee Member, Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (5)	€25,000 (7)					€65,000	
Total				€40,000	€25,000					€65,000	
Ilaria Maria dalla Riva	Director Member, Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee Member, Appointments and Remuneration Committee	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (5)	€10,000 (8)					€50,000	
Total				€40,000	€10,000					€50,000	
Patrizia Riva	Director Member, Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee Member, Appointments and Remuneration Committee	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (5)	€25,000 (9)					€65,000	
Total				€40,000	€25,000					€65,000	
Silvana Bonazzi	Director	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (5)						€40,000	
Total				€40,000						€40,000	
Stefano Giovanni Loro	Executive Director	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€381,827 (10)				€13,882		€395,709	
				€50,000 (2)						€50,000	
Total				€431,827				€13,882		€445,709	
Francesco Bonazzi	Executive Director	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (5)						€40,000	
Total				€40,000						€40,000	
Totale compensi amministratori in carica alla data del 31 dicembre 2025				€2,470,192	€70,000			€24,300		€2,564,492	

Name	Office	Period of office	Concl. of office	Fixed remuneration	Committee remuneration	Variable remuneration		Non-monetary benefits	Other remuneration	Total remuneration	Benefits on conclusions of office
						Bonuses and other incentives	Profit sharing				
Stefano Poggi Longostrevi	Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€60,000 (11)						€60,000	
Total				€60,000						€60,000	
Bettina Solimando	Statutory Auditors	1.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (12)						€40,000	
Total				€40,000						€40,000	
Beatrice Bompieri	Statutory Auditors	01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€40,000 (12)						€40,000	
Total				€40,000						€40,000	
Other Senior Executives		01.01.2025 - 31.12.2025	2025 Accounts								
				€962,806 (13)				€59,431		€1,022,237	
				€795,921 (14)						€795,921	
Total				€1,758,727				€59,431		€1,818,158	

Table 1 notes

1. Remuneration for the position of Chief Executive Officer
2. Remuneration for the position held at Tessilquattro
3. Remuneration for position as Chairperson of the Board of Directors € 100,000 e
Remuneration for the position of Director € 40,000.
4. Attendance fees for participation in the Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee
5. Remuneration for the position of Director
6. Gross Annual Remuneration for the role of General Manager of AquafilUSA
7. Remuneration for the position of Chairperson of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee € 15,000 and
Remuneration for participation in the Control, Risks and Sustainability Committee € 10,000.
8. Remuneration for participation in the Appointments and Remuneration Committee € 10,000.
9. Remuneration for the position as Chairperson of the Risks and Sustainability Committee € 15,000 and
Remuneration for participation in the Appointments and Remuneration Committee € 10,000.
10. Remuneration for the position of Director € 40,000 and
Gross Annual Remuneration for the role of General Manager of BCF € 341,827
11. Compensation for role as Chairperson of the Board of Statutory Auditors
12. Remuneration for the position of Statutory Auditor
13. Gross Annual Remuneration for the position held
14. Gross Annual Remuneration for the position held at subsidiary companies

TABELLA 3B: MONETARY INCENTIVE PLANS FOR MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, GENERAL MANAGERS AND SENIOR EXECUTIVES

Name	Office held	Plan	Bonus for the year			Prior year bonuses		Other Bonuses
			Issuable / Issued	Deferred	Period of deferment	No longer issuable	Issuable / Issued	
Giulio Bonazzi	Chairperson of the BoD and CEO							
		2023-2025 Long-term incentive plan	€43,038	€43,037	1 year			
		2025 Short-term incentive plan	€110,000					€68,810
Remuneration from Company preparing the accounts		2024 Short-term incentive plan						
		2023 Short-term incentive plan						
		2022 Short-term incentive plan			2 years	€46,960	€46,960	
Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates								
Total			€153,038	€43,037		€46,960	€46,960	€68,810
Franco Rossi	Executive Director							
Remuneration from Company preparing the accounts		2023-2025 Long-term incentive plan	€29,266	€29,265				
		2025 Short-term incentive plan	€76,200					€47,660
Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates		2024 Short-term incentive plan						
		2023 Short-term incentive plan						
		2022 Short-term incentive plan			2 years	€21,120	€21,120	
Total			€105,466	€29,265		€21,120	€21,120	€47,660
Stefano Giovanni Loro	Executive Director							
		2023-2025 Long-term incentive plan	€33,648	€33,647				
Remuneration from Company preparing the accounts		2025 Short-term incentive plan	€86,000					€53,790
		2024 Short-term incentive plan						
		2023 Short-term incentive plan						
		2022 Short-term incentive plan			2 years	€23,480	€23,480	
Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates								
Total			€119,648	€33,647		€23,480	€23,480	€53,790
Other Senior Executives								
		2023-2025 Long-term incentive plan	€23,475	€23,475				
Remuneration from Company preparing the accounts		2025 Short-term incentive plan	€189,000					€103,330
		2024 Short-term incentive plan						
		2023 Short-term incentive plan						
		2022 Short-term incentive plan			2 years	€54,060	€54,060	
		2023-2025 Long-term incentive plan	€16,433	€16,433				
Remuneration from subsidiaries and associates		2025 Short-term incentive plan	€92,800					€86,560
		2024 Short-term incentive plan						
		2023 Short-term incentive plan						
		2022 Short-term incentive plan			2 years	€37,290	€37,290	
Total			€321,708	€39,908		€91,350	€91,350	€189,890
OVERALL TOTAL			€699,859	€145,857		€182,910	€182,910	€360,150

SCHEDULE 7-TER: INFORMATION ON HOLDINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND STATUTORY AUDITORS, GENERAL MANAGERS AND SENIOR EXECUTIVES

Name	Office	Investee company	Shares held at the end of the previous year	Shares acquired	Shares sold	Shares held at the end of the reporting year
Directors						
Giulio Bonazzi	Chairperson of the BoD and CEO	Aquafil S.p.A.	51,594,885			51,594,885
Franco Rossi	Executive Director	Aquafil S.p.A.	309,196	22,000		331,196
Stefano Giovanni Loro	Executive Director	Aquafil S.p.A.	21,948			21,948
Senior Executives						
[3]		AquafilSLO D.o.o.	0	26,223		26,223

Arco, March 12, 2026

Aquafil S.p.A.

For the Board of Directors

Chiara Mio

The Chairperson



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