

# MEDIOBANCA

## MEDIOBANCA'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS' CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PUBLIC EXCHANGE OFFER PROMOTED BY MPS

Milan, 14 July 2025



MEDIOBANCA

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Furthermore, the aforementioned projections do not reflect the impact of external or unforeseeable events at the time the Plan was prepared, including any negative effects deriving from the public exchange offer launched on MB by MPS, transaction which, as already communicated, does not have any industrial logic, does not create value for Mediobanca's shareholders and risks compromising the Bank's profitable and sustainable growth strategy. In the event that the acquisition of Banca Generali is completed, the Group will prepare a Plan for the combined entity, which will reflect the new configuration and consolidated objectives of the resulting scope.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## MB KEY STRENGTHS STAND-ALONE

- ◆ In the last decade, Mediobanca ("MB") has constantly **delivered on its strategy and targets**
- ◆ **The extension of the "One Brand – One Culture" Business Plan to 2028 is the coherent continuation of a long-term value-driven journey set to deliver further growth in revenues, profitability and shareholders' remuneration (up to €5bn in 3Y<sup>1</sup>)**
- ◆ **Banca Generali transaction is a strong accelerator able to deliver superior value to MB stakeholders**

## MPS KEY RISK AREAS

- ◆ **A troubled history:** c.€25bn capital increases in last 20 years, market share eroded in last decade by c.1/3 both on loans and deposits, diluted business model
- ◆ **Recent performance driven by NII (2x in last 3Y driven by high interest rates) and tax benefits**
- ◆ **Significant risks remain including asset quality, low RWA density and vulnerability to macro and legal risks (at ~35% of CET1)**

## LACK OF STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL RATIONALE

- ◆ **Business model: undifferentiated** mid-size commercial bank with low growth potential **diluting MB brand, reputation and franchise and no improvement in offering to MB customers**
- ◆ **Consensus<sup>2</sup> based 2028 PBT estimates for MB and MPS resulting in combined growth of c.€350m, mostly driven by MB standalone (c.85%)**
- ◆ **Combined entity destroying value through dis-synergies: c.€460m negative PBT impact** (up to €665m negative in case of no merger) – Additionally, no DTA benefit with acceptance <50% and MREL deficit in case of no merger
- ◆ **Complex governance through a pyramid structure with the same shareholders having a significant presence in three systemic financial institutions**

## THE CONSIDERATION IS INADEQUATE FROM A FINANCIAL POINT OF VIEW

- ◆ **>10% recurring earnings dilution** based on PBT contribution and expected dis-synergies<sup>3</sup>, **same impact also on DPS<sup>4</sup>**
- ◆ **Pro-forma business mix more skewed towards commercial banking**, trading at lower multiples vs WM
- ◆ **At the proposed Exchange Ratio (2.533x), MB shareholders would be exposed to >60% of the risks and the dis-synergies resulting from the combination (assuming 100% acceptance)**
- ◆ **Proposed Exchange Ratio of 2.533x represents a 32% discount vs average of ranges identified by MB BoD of 3.71x**

**THE OFFER IS UNATTRACTIVE AND THE CONSIDERATION IS FINANCIALLY INADEQUATE**

# AGENDA

**Section 1. MB has a superior standalone investment case**

**Section 2. MPS still presents significant risks**

**Section 3. The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale**

**Section 4. MPS offer is inadequate**

**Section 5. Closing remarks**



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# “ONE BRAND – ONE CULTURE” STRATEGIC ROAD MAP

MB has a superior standalone investment case

Section 1

## **Growth in Wealth Management as a priority**

### **Mediobanca is now a strong player in the WM segment,**

with above market average growth rates due to a synergistic approach with CIB,  
an accelerated process of attracting bankers and HNWI clients  
and has announced a public tender offer for Banca Generali to double its size

## **CIB increasingly synergistic with WM**

### **CIB has delivered some of the best profitability in the European sector**

thanks to the strength of its enhanced Private & Investment Banking and growth in capital-light business

## **High sustainable contribution from CF**

### **Compass is the most profitable Consumer Finance operator in the Italian market,**

delivering high margins leveraging its well-recognized multichannel distribution  
and risk assessment capability

## **Capital re-allocation opportunities in INS**
























INS offers a source of high income and dividends uncorrelated with core banking business  
and **capital re-allocation opportunities now envisaged in the Banca Generali offer**

**Unique business model delivering best-in-class  
growth, remuneration and value creation for all stakeholders  
with a further acceleration embedded in Banca Generali offer**

# COHERENT AND STABLE STRATEGY, CONSISTENTLY OVER-DELIVERING ON TARGETS

MB has a superior standalone investment case


Section 1

	BP 2013-16 "From Holding to Banking Group"	BP 2016-19 "Long-Term Value Player"	BP 2019-23 "Distinctive Growth Player"	BP 2023-26 "One Brand – One Culture" June25E <sup>1</sup> (Y2)	Rolling 2028 "One Brand – One Culture"
EUR 3M (avg)	0.1%	-0.3%	0.2%	3.3%	2.7%
Revenue	€1.6bn to €2bn 	up to €2.5bn 	up to €3.3bn 	€3.7bn 	>€4.4bn
EPS	up to €0.69 	up to €0.93 	up to €1.21 	>€1.6 	€2.1 <sup>3</sup>
ROTE	7% 	10% 	13% 	14% 	17% <sup>3</sup>
CET1	12% 	14% 	16% 	~15% 	14%
Capital Distribution	Total 3Y = €0.5bn 	Total 3Y = €1.3bn 	Total 4Y = €2.2bn 	Total 2Y = ~€2.4bn <sup>2</sup> 	Total 3Y = ~€5.0bn
Other	Equity disposal 	Launch of WM 	Digital/ESG upgrade 	RWA optimization	

# BEST IN CLASS TOTAL RETURN FOR SHAREHOLDERS UNDERPERFORMANCE AFTER THE OPS ANNOUNCEMENT

MB has a superior standalone investment case

Section 1




# MB EFFECTIVE BUSINESS MODEL

## STRONG POSITIONING AND DISTINCTIVE STRENGTHS TO CAPITALIZE ON MARKET OPPORTUNITIES

MB has a superior standalone investment case

Section 1






# LONG-TERM VALUE-DRIVEN JOURNEY...

## CONTINUING OUR «ONE BRAND-ONE CULTURE»

MB has a superior standalone investment case

Section 1

### Revenues trend (€bn)




- ◆ **In the last decade we have doubled revenues to €3.7bn**, consistently achieving our targets, continuously growing, rising ambitions. All business segments have been enlarged, contributing positively to growth and profitability
- ◆ **Revenue quality enhanced** by broader diversification and growing contribution from capital-light activities
- ◆ **In the next 3Y, the MB Group expects to deliver ~ €4.4bn revenues, up ~20% from FY25 or +6%<sup>1</sup>**

# ...ENABLING €5BN DISTRIBUTION, >30% CUMULATIVE YIELD IN 3Y AND DPS DOUBLING IN 3Y...

MB has a superior standalone investment case

Section 1

## Cash DPS trajectory (€)



◆ **Next 3Y: ~€5bn cumulative distribution, equal to 30% of current MB market capitalization:**


- ◆ **€4.5bn cash dividends: cash pay-out at 100% of ordinary net profit for FY26, FY27, FY28**
- ◆ **€0.4bn SBB<sup>2</sup> to be executed in FY25/26** (paid out of FY25 earnings)
- ◆ **DPS: +50% in FY26 (to €1.7) and doubling in FY28 (to €2.1)**
- ◆ **Interim dividend confirmed**

# ... REMUNERATING MB INVESTORS WITH HIGH INDUSTRY RETURNS


## MB has a superior standalone investment case

## Section 1


**MB:**  
Top ranked  
for  
cash yield...



...and cash  
pay-out



...thanks to best  
in class  
capital  
generation



# AGENDA

**Section 1. MB has a superior standalone investment case**

**Section 2. MPS still presents significant risks**

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**Section 5. Closing remarks**



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# MPS KEY FOCUS AREAS

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

## 1 A bank with a troubled history

- ◆ Over €25bn capital increases in last 20 years, including various State aids
- ◆ Market share dropped in last decade by c.1/3 both on loans (from ~7% to ~5%) and deposits (from ~6% to ~4%)
- ◆ Diluted business model, with the need to sell all product factories and then focus on distribution

## 2 Recent performance driven by NII and tax benefits

- ◆ Recent MPS positive performance mostly driven by higher rates with NII doubled in 3Y (FY21-FY24), with modest contribution from fee business, sustained by large upfront component
- ◆ P&L impacted by significant tax benefits, with positive income taxes increasing MPS net earnings

## 3 Significant risks remain, undermining capital position

- ◆ Asset quality remains a concern: NPE ratio and average PD almost double vs peers<sup>1</sup>
- ◆ Lower RWA density relative to peers<sup>1</sup> despite poor historical asset quality track record
- ◆ Higher CDS spread and NII sensitivity vs peers<sup>1</sup> add additional vulnerabilities to macro changes
- ◆ Despite declining, legal risk still at ~35% of CET1 (net *petitum* at c.€3.0bn as of Mar-25)

## 4 Limited visibility on profitability and distribution capacity


- ◆ High earnings dispersion driven by lack of visibility on tax benefits impact on P&L
- ◆ Declining RoTE based on consensus, potentially impacting future dividend capacity

# 1 >€25BN CAPITAL INCREASES OVER LAST 20 YEARS


## DUE TO WRONG ACQUISITIONS AND/OR RISK APPETITE

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2



### Total Assets




# 1 FRANCHISE EROSION IN THE LAST 10 YEARS

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

Market share dropped in last decade

Loans and deposits market shares<sup>1</sup> (%)



♦ Market share dropped in last decade both on loans (-2%) and deposits (-2%)

MPS sold product factories re-focusing business on distribution



MPS pre-2008<sup>3</sup>



Today




## 2 RECENT PERFORMANCE DRIVEN BY NII AND TAX BENEFITS

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

### Recent MPS revenue increase helped by higher rates...



### ...as well as by significant tax benefits

€m	FY2021	FY2022 <sup>1</sup>	FY2023	FY2024
Net interest income	1,222	1,536	2,292	2,356
Profit / (loss) before tax	263	(605)	1,707	1,445
Income taxes	49	427	345	506
Profit / (loss) after tax	310	(178)	2,052	1,951

- ◆ Recent revenue increase driven by higher NII contribution:
  - NII has increased by c.25% p.a. between FY2022 and FY2024 with constant loan book

- ◆ Positive income taxes over the last years significantly impacting MPS profitability



### 3 WORSE ASSET QUALITY RATIOS VS PEERS...

#### IMPACT OF FUTURE MACRO DETERIORATION STILL A CONCERN

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

Higher loans probability of default<sup>1</sup>...

	MPS	Avg. Italian banks <sup>3</sup>
SMEs	16%	8%
SME mortgages	15%	9%
Large corp.	5%	3%
Retail mortgages	4%	3%

...as well as poor asset quality metrics vs peers<sup>2</sup>

Bad loans coverage

66%

73%

NPE coverage

50%

53%

Gross NPE ratio

4.4%

2.5%

Avg. Italian banks<sup>3</sup>

### 3 ...ADDING CONCERN TO LOWER RWA DENSITY VS PEERS


MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

Lower RWA density relative to Italian banks...

...posing significant concerns looking forward

RWA density<sup>1</sup>



♦ Significantly lower RWA density relative to Italian banks despite poor historical asset quality track record

♦ Assuming an illustrative alignment of RWA density with Italian banks average would have a material negative impact on MPS CET1 ratio (estimated an impact of approx. (2) percentage points<sup>3</sup>)

### 3 LOWER CREDIT RATING AND HIGH SENSITIVITY TO RATES ADDING FURTHER VULNERBILITIES TO MACRO



MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

CDS spread well above peers

NII highly sensitive to interest rates volatility<sup>2</sup>

CDS spread (bps)<sup>1</sup>



- ♦ Lower rating of MPS vs peers driving high CDS spread
- ♦ Expected rating downgrades of MB following Offer completion

- ♦ MPS benefitted from positive rates movements over the last two years
- ♦ However high sensitivity can undermine future profitability in a decreasing interest rate environment

Source: Bloomberg, Company public information. 1) Pre-announcement as of 20-Jan-25, Italian banks include ISP, MB and UCG (restricted pool); 2) Calculated as impacts on NII from a parallel shift down of 200bps (as per EBA Final Report "Draft Regulatory Technical Standards specifying supervisory shock scenarios, common modelling and parametric assumptions and what constitutes a large decline for the calculation of the economic value of equity and of the net interest income in accordance with Article 98(5a) of Directive 2013/36/EU" from 20 October 2022) divided by the NII reported in FY2024; 3) Italian banks include BAMI, BPER, BPSO, CE, ISP and UCG.


### 3 LEGAL RISK PETITUM REMAINS SIZEABLE (~35% of CET1)

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2

Still significant gross *Petitum* on balance sheet...

Gross *petitum*, Mar-25



...representing a significant portion of CET1 capital

€bn (Mar-25)<sup>1</sup>

Total <i>Petitum</i>	3.5
o/w Legal proceedings	3.2
o/w Risks associated with contractual guarantees	0.3
o/w Out-of-court claims	0.1
Provisions	(0.5)
<b>Total <i>Petitum</i> net of provisions</b>	<b>3.0</b>

♦ Total *Petitum* net of provisions represents c.35% of MPS CET1 capital at Mar-25<sup>2</sup>


## 4 LIMITED EARNINGS VISIBILITY AND DECLINING PROFITABILITY

MPS still presents significant risks

Section 2


### MPS earnings show higher dispersion vs peers

#### Net income dispersion (%)



### Declining RoTE expected

#### RoTE (%)



- ◆ Declining profitability expected
- ◆ Illustrative fully taxed RoTE below 10%

# AGENDA

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# TRANSACTION WEAKENS MB AND THE COMBINED FRANCHISE

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3



## Business model

- **Undifferentiated mid-size commercial bank** with low growth potential damaging MB's specialized businesses with **significant dilution of MB brand, reputation and franchise and no improvement in offering** to MB customers
- **Capital-intensive model** with **unattractive earnings mix, very geared to macro**, vs MB's diversified business model with proven ability to deliver sustainable growth through the cycle



## Financial

- **Substantial value destruction from dis-synergies**
  - €460m negative PBT impact – up to €665m negative in case of no merger
  - Full FY25-28 Mediobanca PBT growth zeroed as challenged by dis-synergies
- **<50% acceptance scenario: no DTA benefit and additional MREL deficit**



## Governance


- **Complex governance through a pyramid structure**
- **Minority shareholders holding significant influence positions in three systemic financial institutions**

**HIGH LEVEL OF EXECUTION AND INTEGRATION RISK**

# COMBINATION WITH MEDIOBANCA INTRODUCES COMPLEXITIES TO MPS'S ALREADY CHALLENGING RESTRUCTURING PATH

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3





# COMBINATION WOULD CREATE A CONGLOMERATE LED BY RETAIL / SME FOCUSED BUSINESS WITHOUT DISTINCTIVE POSITIONING

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3


## Mediobanca

Well diversified business model, with top positioning in specialized, high value-added and profitable businesses, with clear growth opportunities

## MPS

Challenged positioning in Retail and SMEs business, both expected to be under pressure from margins and asset quality in the future

### Revenue Breakdown (%)<sup>1</sup>



**MB'S SPECIALIZED OFFERING TO CUSTOMERS WILL NOT BENEFIT FROM A COMBINATION WITH MPS**

# DILUTION OF MB POSITIVE TRAJECTORY & GEARING TO MACRO

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale


Section 3



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
Revenue growth in all interest rate / macro scenarios...

Revenues (€bn)



...transformed into profit growth due to risk / cost control


Net profit<sup>1</sup> (€bn)



MONTE  
DEI PASCHI  
DI SIENA  
BANCA DAL 1472


Turnaround helped by higher rates, now reversing...

Revenues (€bn)



...with a reduction of net income expected

Net profit<sup>1</sup> (€bn)



Consensus estimate  
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# MEDIOBANCA VIEW ON DIS-SYNERGIES

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3

	Mediobanca view on synergies	MPS view on synergies
<i>Run-rate pre-tax</i>	Combined entity	Combined entity
Revenues	€(495)m	€300m
Costs	€80m	€300m
Funding	€(45)m	€100m
Total	€(460)m	€700m
Integration costs	€(275)m	€(600)m
Financial impacts <sup>1</sup>	Double digit PBT dilution and double digit DPS dilution <sup>2</sup>	Double digit EPS accretion DPS accretion

# DIS-SYNERGIES BY BUSINESS

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3

	Revenues	Costs	Funding	Total
<b>WM (Asset gathering+ Private Banking)</b>	€(275)m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Different customer / staff profile prevent</b> sizeable synergies</li> <li>▪ <b>Loss of HNWI customers</b> for which MPS is not the bank of choice with consequent <b>loss of the best staff</b> – detrimental to existing business and future growth</li> <li>▪ <b>Exit of alternative asset management</b> oriented to institutional and international client base</li> </ul>	None <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Platform serving <b>two very different customer segments</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Positive on Retail and negative on Wholesale</b></li> <li>▪ Higher credit spreads on bonds (downgrade one notch below national champion)</li> <li>▪ Other sources of funding at risk, like Compass direct access to interbank market or bonds issued to third parties banks clients with a corresponding reduction in loan book (CF and LFS)</li> <li>▪ Mix rebalancing and reduction in deposit cost underway at Mediobanca on stand-alone basis</li> </ul>	€(275)m
<b>CIB</b>	€(220)m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Loss of clients</b> taking advantage of execution risk linked to new ownership and lower appeal of retail/domestic brand</li> <li>▪ <b>Loss of top bankers</b> poached by other IB banks</li> <li>▪ <b>Higher complexity</b></li> <li>▪ Specialty finance marginal contribution</li> </ul>	None <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>No overlapping footprint</b> with CIB</li> </ul>		€(220)m
<b>HF / Operations</b>	None	€80m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Limited synergies</b> given different businesses</li> </ul>		€80m + €(45)m <sup>1</sup>
<b>Total</b>	€(495)m	€80m	€(45)m	€(460)m
<b>Phasing (100% Merger)</b>	50% in FY26, 75% in FY27 and 100% in FY28	67% in FY26 and 100% from FY27 onwards	100% from FY26 onwards	


▪ In case of no merger scenario the total funding cost would increase for the issuance of senior preferred bonds to cover MREL deficit at MPS S.p.A. level and the potential difficulties to implement deposit synergies

# DIS-SYNERGIES REVERSING ALL FUTURE GROWTH OF THE COMBINED ENTITY WHICH IS MOSTLY RELIANT ON MB EARNINGS


The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3

PBT<sup>1</sup> increase in 3Y FY25-28 (€m, based on Consensus)



Run-rate dis-synergies by division (€m)





- ◆ According to current analyst consensus, 85% of Combined Entity growth potential in next 3Y derives from Mediobanca
- ◆ Dis-synergies from the MB-MPS combination would completely reverse the future growth potential of the combined entity to FY28

- ◆ MB-MPS combination: €460m dis-synergies expected by FY28 at Group Level, o/w:
  - ◆ MB WM: €275m dis-synergies, ~40% WM PBT in FY28
  - ◆ MB CIB: €220m dis-synergies, ~ 30% CIB PBT in FY28

# COMPLEX GOVERNANCE THROUGH A PYRAMID STRUCTURE WITH THE SAME HAVING A SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE IN THREE SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale

Section 3



**Associated risks:**

- No strategic fit
- Dis-synergies
- Execution risk



**Associated risks:**

- No benefit from acceleration of DTAs
- Incremental MREL costs
- No clarity on where synergies are realised and who will benefit from them

# AGENDA

**Section 1. MB has a superior standalone investment case**

**Section 2. MPS still presents significant risks**

**Section 3. The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale**

**Section 4. MPS offer is inadequate**

**Section 5. Closing remarks**




MEDIOBANCA

# THE IMPLIED OFFER VALUE IS HIGHLY UNATTRACTIVE

MPS offer is inadequate

Section 4

## Implied offer premium based on different relative share prices



OFFER REPRESENTS A DISCOUNT




# >10% EARNINGS DILUTION EXPECTED

MPS offer is inadequate

Section 4

## Pro-forma contribution 2028<sup>1</sup>



- ◆ >10% recurring earnings dilution based on PBT contribution and expected dis-synergies
- ◆ Same dilution impacting also DPS<sup>2</sup>
- ◆ At the proposed Exchange Ratio (2.533x), MB shareholders would be exposed to >60% of the risks and the dis-synergies resulting from the combination (assuming 100% acceptance)


# REPOSITIONING BUSINESS MIX TOWARDS TRADITIONAL BANKING, TRADING AT LOWER MULTIPLES VS WM

MPS offer is inadequate

Section 4


Selected Italian Banks

Average: 8.4x



Selected Italian and European WM

Average: 13.5x



# THE CONSIDERATION IS INADEQUATE FROM A FINANCIAL POINT OF VIEW

MPS offer is inadequate

Section 4

Methodology	Minimum value of the implied exchange ratio	Maximum value of the implied exchange ratio
Dividend Discount Model	3.56x	3.93x
Present Value of Future Share Prices	3.51x	3.99x
Market Multiples	3.46x	3.82x
<b>Average of Advisors Fundamental Methodologies</b>	<b>3.51x</b>	<b>3.91x</b>
<b>Average</b>	<b>3.71x</b>	

- ♦ Proposed Exchange Ratio of 2.533x represents a 32% discount vs average of ranges identified by the BoD of MB
- ♦ At the proposed Exchange Ratio (2.533x), MB shareholders would be exposed to >60% of the risks and the dis-synergies resulting from the combination (assuming 100% acceptance)

**THE CONSIDERATION IS INADEQUATE FROM A FINANCIAL POINT OF VIEW**

# AGENDA

**Section 1. MB has a superior standalone investment case**

**Section 2. MPS still presents significant risks**

**Section 3. The combination of MPS and MB lacks strategic and financial rationale**

**Section 4. MPS offer is inadequate**

**Section 5. Closing remarks**



MEDIOBANCA

# CLOSING REMARKS

## Closing remarks

## Section 5

### MPS TRANSACTION LACKS OF RATIONALE ...

- ◆ **Strategic rationale is weak** due to the **absence of business model enhancement** for both entities
- ◆ **The combined entity risk profile would be weighed down** not only by MPS risk profile **but also from the execution risk of the transaction and from unclear governance**
- ◆ **Financial rationale is evanescent:**
  - ◆ **MPS performance has been driven by interest rate momentum and profitability has been sustained by DTA**
  - ◆ MB foresees **substantial value destruction from dis-synergies: €460m negative PBT impact** (up to €665m negative in case of no merger)

### ...AND OFFERS AN INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION

- ◆ **The consideration is entirely in MPS shares**
- ◆ **Proposed Exchange Ratio of 2.533x represents a 32% discount vs average of ranges identified by MB BoD of 3.71x**
- ◆ **At the proposed Exchange Ratio (2.533x), MB shareholders would be exposed to >60% of the risks and the dis-synergies resulting from the combination (assuming 100% acceptance)**

**MEDIOBANCA STANDALONE TO DELIVER STRONG GROWTH BY LEVERAGING DISTINCTIVE FEATURES  
(3Y CUMULATED DISTRIBUTION UP TO €5BN)  
AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD  
(BANCA GENERALI DEAL TO CREATE THE LEADING ITALIAN WEALTH MANAGER FOCUS ON PIB MODEL)**

# MEDIOBANCA STAND-ALONE: KEY BENEFITS FOR SHAREHOLDERS...

Closing remarks

Section 5



**Stronger industrial footprint driving high and sustainable growth**

**Superior capital generation**

**High cash distributions**

**Targeting industry-leading performance with low execution risk**

**REVENUES +6%<sup>1</sup> to €4.4bn**  
**EPS recurring +9%<sup>1</sup> to €2.1**  
**EPS stated +14%<sup>1</sup> to €2.4**  
**TBVPS<sup>2</sup> + 3YDPS: +15%<sup>1</sup> to €18-19**

**ROTE<sup>2</sup> recurring up to 17%**  
**ROTE<sup>2</sup> stated up to 20%**  
**CET1 ~14%, T1 ~15.5%**  
**Annual K generation: 280bps**

**Shareholder remuneration**  
**Cumulative €5bn in 3Y**  
**€4.5bn cash + 0.4bn SBB**  
**DPS doubling**  
**from €>1.1ps to €2.1ps**  
**Cumulative yield ~30%<sup>3</sup>**

# ... TO BE FURTHER ENHANCED WITH BANCA GENERALI

Closing remarks

Section 5



**Significant capital  
reallocation  
from INS to WM**

**Focus MB on faster  
growing, capital light WM  
business**

**Enhance size, quality  
and visibility of  
revenues and profits**

**Mediobanca: a fast growing, leading Wealth Manager  
with a unique positioning and yield in European market**

**UNIQUE EQUITY STORY**

**ACCRETIVE TRANSACTION**

**UNLOCK SYNERGIES**

# MEDIOBANCA

## MEDIOBANCA'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS' CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PUBLIC EXCHANGE OFFER PROMOTED BY MPS

Milan, 14 July 2025



MEDIOBANCA



# Appendix

# REVENUES: DIS-SYNERGIES DUE TO IMPACT ON PIB, UNCHANGED PROFILE ON OTHER BUSINESSES

Revenues	Mediobanca view on synergies	MPS view on synergies
Retail Banking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No cross-selling opportunities to Compass on payments, any/low savings investment needs, insurance products already leveraged</li> <li>▪ No change in scale and positioning of MPS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Offering MPS daily products to Compass and Mediobanca Premier clients</li> <li>▪ Delivery of MPS branch network at scale</li> </ul>
CIB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SME segment not synergistic with Private &amp; IB</li> <li>▪ Increase complexity and bureaucracy not useful for a fast moving and agile IB business</li> <li>▪ No scope for revenues synergies, special finance marginal contribution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enhanced product offering combining advisory capabilities with a solid balance sheet</li> <li>▪ Cross-selling of IB products and services (e.g. ECM and DCM) to MPS Corporates and SMEs</li> <li>▪ Leveraging on respective competencies in specialty finance</li> </ul>
Consumer Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Compass already partner of MPS, risk to lose other commercial banking agreements</li> <li>▪ Rigorous approach to value and risk under threat in a large undifferentiated commercial bank, without governance track record</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Increase penetration of consumer finance products building on Compass</li> <li>▪ Cross-selling of ancillary products (e.g. insurance) thanks to MPS best practices</li> </ul>
WM (Asset gathering + Private Banking)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Size synergies prevented by different customer / staff profile</li> <li>▪ Loss of HNWI customers for which MPS is not the bank of choice with consequent loss of the best staff – detrimental to existing business and future growth (NNM capacity at €5bn)</li> <li>▪ One-offs costs related to retention of Private Bankers and FAs and RMs in Premier</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Accelerated growth facilitated by immediate achievement of Financial Advisors critical size</li> <li>▪ Enhanced product offering through MB AM products (e.g. alternative investments)</li> <li>▪ Alignment of MPS PB to MB best practices</li> <li>▪ Enhanced product offering through MB AM products (e.g. alternative investments)</li> </ul>

# COSTS: LIMITED SCOPE FOR SYNERGIES GIVEN NO OVERLAP OF BUSINESSES

Costs	Mediobanca view on synergies	MPS view on synergies
CIB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Limited synergies, marginal businesses overlapping</li> <li>▪ No overlapping footprint with CIB</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Optimization of product factories (e.g., MBFACTA and MPS Factoring, respective NPE workout units)</li> <li>▪ Optimization of overlapping footprint coverage</li> </ul>
Consumer Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Compass cost/income already at 30%</li> <li>▪ No scale effect on open market where digital investments are more relevant</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rationalization of existing platforms</li> <li>▪ Economies of scale on digital investments</li> </ul>
WM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Null additional synergies without merger</li> <li>▪ MB already planning a rationalization of common functions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Synergies on operational platforms</li> <li>▪ Optimization of central structures</li> </ul>
HF/ Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Limited synergies due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Central cost base stable at €120m</li> <li>▪ Preserve some specific control functions</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Even less without merger (from €80 to €50m)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Optimization of overlapping holding functions</li> <li>▪ Streamlining of IT and operations to reduce cost to serve through digitalization</li> <li>▪ Economies of scale on Procurement activity with immediate focus on large service providers</li> <li>▪ Centralized cost governance</li> </ul>

# FUNDING: LIMITED SCOPE FOR SYNERGIES GIVEN POSSIBLE RATING DOWNGRADE

Funding	Mediobanca view on synergies	MPS view on synergies
Mix	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Better loan/deposits ratio</li> <li>▪ Mix rebalancing and reduction in deposit cost underway at Mediobanca on stand-alone basis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More balanced funding mix for the combined entity</li> </ul>
Wholesale funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Higher credit spread as expected by rating agency and investors</li> <li>▪ On average €6.7bn issuance per year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Optimization of the wholesale funding structure also leveraging on MPS commercial funding base</li> </ul>
Interbank funding and deposit reduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Loan book reduction in CF and LFS due to reduction in funding (-5.5bn at FY28)</li> <li>▪ Compass would most probably lose the greater part of its interbank market access (maintain €1bn out of €2.5bn at FY28)</li> <li>▪ WM deposit outflows would affect LFS growth</li> </ul>	